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Chemical and process facilities (CPFs) are often characterized by the storage and processing of hazardous 
materials, frequently in large amounts and at severe temperatures and pressures. Thus, CPFs are 
recognized as an attractive target for a variety of criminal categories: from terroristic organizations to 
common thieves and vandals. A set of physical protection systems are usually installed and periodically 
revised in order to avoid intrusion and, eventually, to mitigate consequences that could arise from 
malicious attacks. However, less attention was posed to date to the possibility of interference with the 
process by intrusions via the cyber space. Basic control loops, frequently used in CPFs, are ruled by 
computers responsible for their correct operation. These usually are interconnected one to each other 
(assembling the plant net), and to the external internet via the corporate LAN.  Process control system 
governs all the operative and safety functions in medium and large facilities, and hence it has the potential 
to create outcomes even more severe than those triggered by physical actions. Cyber-attackers belong to 
a wide range of sub-categories, each characterized by precise intents and tools. Several accidents due to 
cyber threats were reported in recent years, and the trend seems to be increasing. Cyber-attacks might 
target industrial facilities exploiting a focused intrusion via a hacker tactic, or employing intrusive tools 
as viruses or worms. Usually the worm/virus is not tailored for industrial control systems, but it breaches 
the company network protection compromising operations. Defense-in-depth concepts to address process 
interference and intentional releases due to cyber threats were developed. Hazard identification was 
carried out by a specific procedure to understand how the process system might react after a cyber 
intrusion: disturbances caused on the plant have been systematically analyzed and combined. Although 
no specific protection of software systems is required, a range of potential scenarios having different 
severity emerged. Results point out that cyber threats pose specific process hazards that need to be 
included in the safety assessment and management systems of CPFs. 
 
 
